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Go¨del, Tarski, Church, and the Liar
Gyo¨rgy Sere´ny
‘What is a sadist? A sadist is a person who is kind to a masochist.’ When I first heard
this joke, I smiled, of course, realizing that the brutality of the sadist is, in fact, kindness to
a masochist, which is the source of the comic effect being a(n apparent) contradiction resolved.
What I did not realize was that I would have had another reason to smile: the kindness of the
sadist tortures the masochist. Well, then how should a sadist treat a masochist? Is this really
a joke or might it be a serious scientific question? 1 The writer Arthur Koestler in his study,
examining the connection between science and art, thinks that it is both ([K] p.95.):
Comic discovery is paradox stated – scientific discovery is paradox resolved.
I think, he is utterly right. In fact, it will emerge from what we shall do below that the general
ideas underlying some of the main mathematical results of this century, those concerning the
incompleteness and undecidability of arithmetic and the undefinability of truth within it can,
at least partly, be taken as different ways to resolve the archetype of our initial paradoxical
question. The paradoxical nature of the famous Go¨del’s theorem2 and its less broadly known
but equally important and enlightening relatives, the theorems of Tarski and Church, which
together constitute the core of the family of the results of modern mathematical logic describing
the theoretical limitations of formal reasoning, is inherited from their ancient and not less famous
ancestor, one of the most important of all logical paradoxes, that of the Liar. 3
In fact, our aim in this article is just to show that an abstract formal variant of the Liar paradox
constitutes a general conceptual schema that, revealing their common logical roots, connects the
theorems referred to above and, at the same time, demonstrates that, in a sense, these are the
only possible relevant limitation theorems formulated in terms of truth and provability alone
that can be considered as different manifestations of the Liar paradox. On the other hand,
as we shall illustrate by a simple example, this abstract version of the paradox opens up the
possibility to formulate related results concerning notions other than just those of the truth and
provability.
To obtain the resolution of the paradox in a general, purely formal wording, we shall refor-
mulate the infamous statement of the Liar in a step by step manner in two main stages. First
we shall seek an ordinary–language equivalent of the paradox in a form that shows clearly its
logical structure, then we shall directly translate the expression we have obtained into a formal
language. By applying the generalized version of the result of this formalization process to
the logical systems used to describe mathematical theories, we shall finally make explicit the
connection between the age old paradox and its modern reincarnations. Let us start with the
origins.
1Frigyes Karinthy, whose name in Hungary means something like those of Oscar Wilde and Monty Python
together in Britain, posed the following question:
If to be a madman is to have an obsession, and my only obsession is that I am a madman, have I really lost my mind or
not?
2Using W.V.Quine’s words:
[Go¨del’s discovery] is decidedly paradoxical in the sense that it upsets crucial preconceptions. We used to think that
mathematical truth consisted in provability. ([Q] p.17.)
3The fact that Go¨del’s theorem and the Liar paradox are related closely is, of course, not only well known, but
is a part of the common knowledge of logician community. Actually, almost every more or less formal treatment
of the theorem makes a reference to this connection. Well, Go¨del himself is not an exception as he made a remark
in the paper announcing his result (cf. [G]):
The analogy between this result and Richard’s antinomy leaps to the eye; there is also a close relationship with the ‘liar’
antinomy, since ... we are ... confronted with a proposition which asserts its own unprovability.
In the light of the fact that the existence of this connection is a commonplace, all the more surprising that very
little can be learnt about its exact nature except perhaps that it is some kind of similarity or analogy.
1. The paradoxes
a. The Liar paradox
Perhaps the most widely known version of the paradox, which is called the paradox of
Epimenides, appears in the New Testament. St.Paul, referring to Epimenides of Crete, says
(St. Paul’s epistle to Titus (I, 12)):
One of themselves, even a prophet of their own, said, ‘Cretans are always liars, evil beasts, lazy gluttons.’
As a matter of fact, the statement ‘Cretans are always liars’ uttered by a Cretan is not a logical
paradox since it must simply be false. On the other hand, it indeed exhibits remarkable para-
doxical features since the apparently contingent fact that some Cretans existed who sometime
told the truth turns out to be a logical necessity.
The paradox in a clear-cut purely logical form is generally attributed to the Greek philosopher
Eubulides from Miletos. He lived in the fourth century B.C. and belonged to the school of
Megara. Eubulides formulated the paradox in the form of the following puzzle : 4
A man says that he is lying. Is what he says true or false?
So the paradox consists in the fact that the sentence ‘I am lying’ can be neither true nor false
since its truth implies its falsity and vice versa. Now, in logical investigations it is natural to
consider the impersonal version of the original paradoxical sentence. Consequently, from now
on, we shall examine the sentence below, which will simply be called the Liar :
This sentence is false.
One of the innumerable attempts to get rid of the paradox caused by the impossibility to assign
truth value to the Liar was the claim according to which it only pretends to be a declarative
sentence of the subject–predicative form, which must be either true or false, since it has not
really got a subject. In fact, in order for a noun phrase to play the role of the subject of a
meaningful sentence, it has to be a complete linguistic entity. In this case, however, the noun
phrase under consideration, the sentence itself, is just in statu nascendi 5 at the point where the
need for the subject appears. Thus, without a proper subject, the sentence is not paradoxical
but simply meaningless. Alternatively, we can eliminate the paradox accepting the analysis of
Quine:
. . . the phrase ‘this sentence’, so used refers to nothing. This is claimed on the grounds that you cannot
get rid of the phrase by supplying a sentence that is referred to. For what sentence does the phrase refer
to? The sentence ‘This sentence is false’. If, accordingly, we supplant the phrase ‘This sentence’ by a
quotation of the sentence referred to, we get: ‘ “This sentence is false” is false’. But the whole outside
sentence here attributes falsity no longer to itself but merely to something other than itself, thereby
engendering no paradox. ([Q] p.7). 6
Anyway, the Liar is in this form untenable, so we should modify it in order to preserve our
paradox.7 Since, clearly, the paradoxical character of the Liar stems from its attributing falsehood
4The fact that the Megarians did take puzzles seriously is reflected in the story according to which one of them,
Diodorus Cronus allegedly committed suicide because he was not immediately able to solve a logical puzzle.
5being born
6A similar criticism is propounded by G. Ryle (cf. [R]):
If unpacked our pretended assertion would run ‘The current statement {namely that the current statement [namely that
the current statement (namely that the current statement . . . ’. The brackets are never closed; no verb is ever reached; no
statement of which we can even ask whether it is true or false is ever adduced.
I think that the infinite regression referred to in this quotation can be represented in the physical world, of course,
by the very nature of the representation, only in a non–complete way. Let us try to represent a picture that is
about itself. Well, the optical phenomenon it yields might be like the infinite–looking array of ever decreasing
pictures the sight of which we experience when, standing between two mirrors facing each other, we are looking
at one of them.
7Obviously, every variant of the usual practice of giving a name to our sentence and referring to it by this
name, that is e.g. the following presentation of the paradox
to itself, we can get help from the analysis of another famous paradox explicitly based on
the self–reference 8 providing opportunity for a more systematic examination of self–referential
sentences.9
b. The Quine paradox
The paradox of heterologicality was devised by the German mathematician Kurt Grelling in
1908. An adjective is called autological if the property denoted by the adjective holds for the
adjective itself, otherwise it is called heterological. For example, ‘short’, ‘English’, ‘polysyllabic’,
‘mispelt’, ‘adjectival’ are autological, while ‘long’, ‘German’, ‘monosyllabic’, ‘obsolete’, ‘obscene’,
and ‘non–adjectival’, for that matter, are heterological. Well, then, what about the adjective
‘heterological’ itself? Clearly, it is neither true nor false of itself so it can be neither autological
nor heterological, providing a paradox.
The Grelling paradox is closely related to the Liar. Actually, the fact that ‘heterological’ is
neither true nor false of itself can be utilized to formulate a sentence with the same paradoxical
nature as the Liar. Indeed, for any adjective, say ‘white’, ‘consists of four words’, or ‘heterologi-
cal’, the fact that an object possesses the property referred to by the adjective can be expressed
by a sentence resulting from the application of the adjective to the noun naming the object.
This sentence is true just in the case that the object does possess the property considered. Thus
‘snow is white’ is true, ‘ “snow is white” consists of four words ’ and ‘ “does not consist of four
words” consists of four words’ are false, while
(1) ‘consists of four words’ consists of four words
is again true.10 So far so good. But what about the following sentence :
(2) ‘heterological’ is heterological.
Clearly, it can be neither true nor false, yielding a variant of the Grelling paradox in a form
of a sentence sharing the main characteristic of the Liar being without truth value. Yet, it is
immune against the kind of criticism that the Liar was open to since it does have a proper
subject. Of course, it relies heavily on the meaning of the technical term in it, so, in order
to obtain a sentence that stands on its own feet, the term ‘heterological’ must be eliminated.
Before looking for a common language version of (2), however, we should step back and examine
the autological sentence (1) more thoroughly. For the way it expresses its meaning points to an
underlying general pattern for handling self-reference in an apparently unobjectionable way. In
fact, it contains implicitly the following definition of self-reference :
(3) ‘applied to itself’ is equivalent to ‘appended to its own quotation’.
Now, by definition, ‘heterological’ means ‘yields falsehood when applied to itself’, which, in turn,
(*) The sentence (*) is false ,
does not make much difference and is open to essentially the same objections as its original version.
8 the linguistic phenomenon of being about itself
9As we shall see later, however, there are both informal and formal arguments proving that, in itself, the
self-reference in the Liar is innocent; it cannot be blamed for the paradox. Actually, our formalization process
will clarify the difference between the roles played by different factors the paradox is built on.
10The existence of completely meaningful and immaculate applications of autologicality like this sentence pro-
vides informal evidence that the self-reference in the Liar, in itself, cannot be the source of the paradox. Neverthe-
less, self-reference is not so innocent and banal a phenomenon as, for example, Hofstadter thinks it is ([H] p.7):
Self-reference is ubiquitous. It happens every time anyone says ‘I’ or ‘me’ or ‘word’ or ‘speak’ or ‘mouth’. It happens
every time a newspaper prints a story about reporters, every time someone writes a book about writing, designs a book
about book design, makes a movie about movies, or writes an article about self-reference.
Well, the examples listed in this quotation, with the only exception of the personal pronoun, are not self-
referential (at least in the sense of the word related to interesting logico-linguistic phenomena worth considering),
since they are simply not about themselves, the word ‘word’ refers to any word not this particular one (‘these
words’ – but not ‘this word’ – would do something like that), a story about reporters is not a story about the
particular story concerned, a book about writing is not a book about itself (but about writing) etc. On the other
hand, clearly, proper self-reference is not a boring everyday linguistic act as the famous paradoxes (among them
those we are just examining) exemplify, which are all built on it in some way or other.
by (3), is equivalent to ‘yields falsehood when appended to its own quotation’. Applying this
translation to (2), we obtain a masterpiece version of the Liar due to Quine (cf. [Q] p.7).
The Quine paradox :
‘yields falsehood when appended to its own quotation’
yields falsehood when appended to its own quotation.
In fact, this sentence does have a subject, which is just the name of the string of words in its
second row. For, according to the usual practice (which we also tacitly assumed already), the
name of a string of words is simply the string itself between quotation marks. Thus the Quine
paradox tells something about the bearer of this name, that is, the string of words in its second
row, namely that the sentence that can be obtained by putting it down in a particular way – first
between quotation marks then without them – is false. But, of course, the resulting sentence is
the Quine paradox itself. That is, this sentence indeed says of itself that it is false. Moreover,
having a proper subject, it is a completely well-formed sentence.
Having obtained the Quine paradox, it seems that we achieved our aim to present a natural
language version of the Liar in a form that can be formalized in a straightforward way. As
a matter of fact, we indeed made an important step in the right direction, but, as we shall
see below, there remains yet another step to take since the paradox above has some essential
imperfections. The way we shall improve its formulation is implicitly present in the critical
arguments this claim is based on. Actually, it is a reassuring fact that they all point in the same
direction.
c. The Findlay paradox
First of all, having given due credit to the ingenuity of the Quine paradox, we should notice
that we have been cheated by it. There is a trick that made it possible to formulate it as a well–
formed sentence without using the notion of heterologicality. On the one hand, it is clear that
the bearers of truth and falsity are the declarative sentences; they are those linguistic entities
that can be true or false. 11 This means that the Quine paradox can be reformulated as follows:
(4) ‘yields a false statement when appended to its own quotation’
yields a false statement when appended to its own quotation.
The subject of this sentence, the actor who performs the action expressed by the verb ‘yield’ is
the following string of words
(5) yields a false statement when appended to its own quotation.
But it is an abuse of the verb ‘yield’ since, clearly, it is not this string of words that makes
the false statement! The reason is simple enough: there is no string of words that can build a
sentence, true or false. Any sentence can come to existence only if there is an actor (supposedly
intelligent), perhaps unknown, who performs the act of building it the way described in the
Quine paradox, that is, attaching the string of words considered to its quotation. What is more,
it is highly probable that this criticism can be generalized to any possible reformulation of (5),
since it seems self–evident that there is no linguistic means by which a part of a sentence as a
linguistic entity can render the whole sentence whose part it is, false (or true, for that matter).
The reason is the same as above, the sentences are not rendered false or true by their parts, they
are false or true. 12 The moral is that we should try to construct another statement analogous
11An important remark is in order here. We shall not make the usual distinction made by philosophers of
language between the three notions that can appear in connection with this question, namely the notion of a
sentence, as the linguistic embodiment of its meaning, that of the meaning itself, which is called a proposition
(expressed by the sentence), and finally the notion of a statement, which is a word usually used to refer to the
act that we perform in uttering a declarative sentence. The reason is that, although generally these distinctions
indeed may be relevant (cf. e.g. [A]), from the point of view of our analysis they are entirely immaterial.
12Similar arguments apply to analogous but less neat reformulations of (2) as e.g. the following one
(cf. [R] p.167):
‘appended to its own quotation is false’ appended to its own quotation is false,
to the Quine paradox using a whole sentence instead of the adjectival phrase (5).
Secondly, we may not expect that, without any modification, the Grelling paradox, which is
a statement about an adjective, will provide a correct formulation of the Liar paradox, which
is a statement about a sentence. A natural way to achieve this goal is, obviously, the same
as we indicated above, that is, to formulate a sentence that will play the role of the adjectival
phrase (5).
Finally, let us consider the most important reason to change the phrase (5) in (4) to a suitable
sentence. In fact, bearing in mind that our aim is to formalize the Liar, we should not have been
satisfied with the Quine paradox even if the arguments above had not been convincing enough,
since the fact it conveys the intended meaning is based on a contingent characteristic of English
language. In fact, in English language, the usual word–order in declarative sentences is ‘subject
+ verb + . . . ’ , that is, the role of a phrase in a sentence is shown not by its form but by its
position in the sentence. Consequently, generally, if there is no indication to do otherwise, a
noun–phrase at the beginning of a sentence, however complicated it may be, is automatically
taken as the subject of the sentence by a speaker of English. Thus, in English, the linguistic
application of an adjective (or adjectival phrase) to an object means a simple attachment of the
adjective (or adjectival phrase) to the name of the object. (In the case of the Quine paradox, the
name of the object is the object itself between quotation marks.) Therefore, the construction
underlining the Quine paradox is based on a special feature of English language.13 This fact
means that we cannot expect the Quine paradox to exhibit its language–independent logical
structure, which is what we actually need in order to formulate our original paradox in a purely
formal system. Consequently, we ought to look for an abstract ‘language–free’ procedure to
execute the linguistic application of an adjective to a noun.
Fortunately, all languages as well as every logical system have a common formal tool for han-
dling the application of one linguistic entity (an adjective (or adjectival phrase)) to another
one (a noun (phrase)), namely the substitution. Given a sentence asserting that the indefinite
subject of the sentence, denoted usually by a single letter and called (logical) variable, possess
the property expressed by the adjective(al phrase) we would like to apply to our object, we
can execute this linguistic application by substituting the name of our object for the indefinite
subject of the sentence. Thus e.g. the linguistic application of the adjective ‘red’ to snow can
be executed by substituting the name of the latter for the letter x in the sentence ‘x is red’,
which will yield the sentence ‘snow is red’. Actually, we can alternatively interpret (1) as a
result of a suitable substitution rather than that of appending a phrase to its name.14 Well, the
which makes the deception more apparent since, obviously, it states that the phrase ‘appended to its own quotation
is false’ is false (when appended to its own quotation), which is plainly absurd since this phrase is neither false nor
true, it is simply meaningless in itself. One can hardly suppress the feeling that the language cannot be deceived:
what cannot be said, cannot be thought. Well, what cannot be said in a natural language may be formulated
in an artificial one. For within a formalized system, the linguistic competence (the ability to understand and
use everyday language correctly) does not matter. In fact, interpreting the phrase ‘applied to itself’ as meaning
‘followed by its own quotation’ and mirroring formally the latter by concatenation, Smullyan has managed to
construct formal languages capable of handling self-reference (see [S1]). Concatenation was, among others, used
by Quine as a basis for various formal constructions (cf. [Q1]) and it is probable that his paradox formulated
in everyday English was influenced by his artificial language practice. On the other hand, the idea underlying
Smullyan’s formal construction is related to Quine’s informal one (cf. [S1] p.56 footnote 6). Formal systems,
however, endowed by concatenation are not widely used. I wonder whether the reason why the substitution, as
a formal linguistic tool (which we shall describe soon), is preferred to concatenation is the fact that substitution
(as opposed to concatenation) is commonly used in mathematics, and, clearly, the best way for a formal language
to satisfy the natural requirement to be as easily comprehensible as possible is to mimic formally the everyday
languages, among them the language of everyday mathematics, as faithfully as possible.
13I cannot resist the temptation to make use of my knowledge of an ‘exotic’ language in order to give evidence
backing this claim. In fact, the construction leading to the Quine paradox cannot be executed in Hungarian
since a phrase like the Quine paradox is simply ungrammatical (though comprehensible) without a definite article
preceding the subject of the sentence, that is, (3) is simply not true in Hungarian.
14Note that not only the artificial languages use symbols to refer to indefinite subjects, it is a common practice
of natural languages as well. As a matter of fact, the following sentence illustrates a possible use of the word
substitution is a formal, entirely language–independent operation, its result does not depend
on the specific structure of the sentence which it is applied to, the variable guarantees that the
subject of the new sentence we obtain after the substitution will indeed be the name of the given
object. Moreover, this transformation is also general in the sense that it, in principle, can be
defined for formal and informal languages as well.
We can now obtain a language–independent abstract form of the notion of self–reference by
changing the transformation in (3) to substitution in a suitable way (and using the fact that the
quotation is only a particular way to give a name to a linguistic object):
(6) ‘applied to itself’ is equivalent to ‘its name is substituted for the variable in it’.
Accepting this interpretation, however, has its consequences. Clearly, (6) implies directly that
a linguistic entity, in order for it to be meaningfully applied to itself, has to be a sentence having
a single variable in it. Therefore, to obtain the version of the Liar we seek, we should modify our
original notion of heterologicality according to this new notion of self-reference. Well, we shall
define sentences with single variables (not adjectives or adjectival phrases) to be heterological.
It is fairly obvious that if we look for a sentence with a single variable that in a way expresses
the same thing as an adjective a, then the most immediate candidate will be the sentence ‘x is
a’. Moreover, (6) implies that we have to consider the sentence ‘x is a’ to be heterological just
in the case that ‘ “x is a” is a ’ is a false sentence. Since, with the notion of substitution at our
disposal, we are already able to be more formal, let us give the exact definition:
A sentence with a single variable is called heterological if the new sentence
obtained by substituting the name of the sentence for the variable in it is false.
For example, since ‘x is not a string of letters’ is a string of letters, the sentence ‘ “x is not a
string of letters” is not a string of letters ’ is false, consequently ‘x is not a string of letters’ is
heterological. Now, the only thing that remains to do is to turn back to (2) and reformulate it
using our modified notion. The sentence corresponding to (2) will be
(7) ‘x is heterological’ is heterological.
Using our definition of heterologicality above, ‘x is heterological’ takes the following form: ‘the
new sentence obtained by substituting the name of the sentence x for the variable in it is false’,
which, in turn, by (7), provides the Findlay paradox : 15
the new sentence obtained by substituting the name of the sentence
‘the new sentence obtained by substituting the name of the sentence
x for the variable in it is false’ for the variable in it is false.
Note that just in the same way as we did in the case of the Quine paradox, it can directly be
checked that this sentence indeed says of itself that it is false (and says nothing more) since it
is built up in such a way that if we perform the substitution described in it, then we obtain
the sentence itself, which is stated to be false. Moreover, it is a perfectly well formed sentence.
Finally, its paradoxical character does not depend on any contingent linguistic fact, it is entirely
language–independent so can immediately be translated to any language, be it natural or formal.
Thus, at last, having an impeccable common language version of our original paradox, we can
turn to embedding it to an abstract formal logico–linguistic system in order to examine the
possible ways to resolve it.
‘substitute’ in the Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary of Current English ([Ho]): ‘Mr X substituted for the
teacher who was in hospital’. Of course, the following example would have served us even better: ‘The teacher
substituted for Mr X who was in hospital’.
15J. Findlay used sentences of the same structure to examine informally Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem (cf. [F]).
2. The formal resolution of the paradoxes
a. The abstract system of Smullyan
The Findlay paradox implicitly contains the minimal requirements an abstract system within
which the paradox can be formulated should meet. In fact, it has to contain the formal versions of
elements of natural languages used for setting down the paradox. These are the formal versions
of any string of letters (they will be called expressions), those of the (meaningful) sentences,
which can be true or false, and the sentences having single variables (in formal terms these two
sets together are called formulas), a set of objects that will play the role of the names of the
linguistic objects, and two mappings for representing the procedure of naming and that of the
substitution. Finally, the notion of truth can be represented formally by an arbitrary subset
of sentences. The elements of this set we shall consider to be true. Our definition below is a
slightly modified version of the notion appearing in [S2] (p.5).16 First we set some notation.
Notation
For any sets X, Y , and Z ⊆ X, and for any function f : X −→ Y ,
X ∼ Y = {x ∈ X : x 6∈ Y }, f∗Z = {y ∈ Y : f(x) = y for some x ∈ Z}.
If f is one-one, the inverse of f will be denoted by f−1.
Definition
S = 〈E,S, F,N, g, s〉 is an abstract formal system if
(i) ∅ 6= S ⊆ F ⊆ E and N is an arbitrary set such that F ∩ N = ∅ . E is the set of
expressions, while S,F , and N are called the sets of formulas, (formal) sentences, and
names respectively. The elements of F ∼ S are the proper formulas. We set ∼ A = F ∼ A
for any A ⊆ F and ∼ X = N ∼ X for any X ⊆ N .
(ii) g is a one-one mapping from F onto N . g is the naming function of S. For any subset
of F , we shall denote the image of this subset under g by the boldface version of the letter
denoting the subset concerned, that is, e.g. if H ⊆ F , then g∗H will be denoted by H.
(iii) s is a mapping from F ×N into S such that s(σ, n) = σ for any σ ∈ S, n ∈ N . s is the
substitution in S. We shall denote s(ϕ, n) by ϕ[n] for any ϕ ∈ F, n ∈ N .
Now, let us try to formulate the formal version of the Findlay paradox in S. Let T ⊆ S be
arbitrary. We shall consider T to be the set of true sentences of S and, by the same token, the
sentences outside T to be the false ones. Further, in the case of any common language sentence
s having a single variable x, we shall abbreviate the result of substituting a linguistic phrase q
for the variable x in s by s(q). Just as we did so far, we shall denote the name of any common
language expression e by ‘e’. Moreover, let us denote the phrase ‘the new sentence obtained by
substituting the name of the sentence x for the variable in it is false’ by p. Using these notations,
the Findlay paradox, abbreviated by f from now on, takes the following form:
(8) f = p(‘p’).
First of all, note that only names of objects can be substituted for a variable in a linguistic
phrase. Thus x stands for a name in the phrase
(9) the new sentence obtained by substituting the name of the sentence x for the variable in it.
Therefore, in (9), the name of the sentence x is just x 17, so in its formal version again the name
of the formula x is just x, consequently the formula itself is g−1(x) and
(10) the formal version of the whole phrase (9) is g−1(x)[x] .
Consequently, using the terminology provided by S, p corresponds to the following sentence:
(11) g−1(x)[x] 6∈ T .
16Smullyan, in excellent papers and books, examined Go¨del’s theorem in original ways both from the point of
view of various abstract formal systems and within the framework of ingenious logical puzzles, which are very
interesting and enlightening both to the expert and the interested layman (see e.g. [S1], [S2], [S3]).
17Similarly as e.g. the name of the sentence ‘ This is obvious. ’ is the following object: ‘ This is obvious. ’ .
This sentence will be denoted by p.
It is important to note that the phrase (9) is undefined, it ‘depends on x’, that is, it does
not denote a unique sentence, the object it refers to may change with the name of the sentence
that is substituted for the variable x. This property is, of course, inherited by its formal version
g−1(x)[x] as well as by the phrases they are contained in, namely p and p, so p becomes a single
sentence only as a result of substituting an n ∈ N (a formal name of an expression) for the
variable x in it.
Well, of course, p is generally not an expression belonging to S, but a statement about S ! It is
still a natural language reformulation of p in terms of the abstract formal system S. Consequently,
not belonging to the set of expressions of S, it does not posses a formal name (it is not in the
domain of the naming function g), so there is no formal version of ‘ p ’. It follows, then, that
we cannot continue the process of formalization, which, by (8), would be the substitution of
this name for the variable x in p in order to obtain the formal version of f . In other words,
the paradox simply disappears since it cannot be formulated at all.18 Consequently, we get to a
crucial point in the reconstruction of the paradox within our formal framework.
b. The Formal Liar
For obvious reasons, we do not want to breathe life into our dead paradox (for that matter,
even if we wanted to, we could not). What we do want is to reformulate it into a statement
about the expressive power of our formal system, a statement to the effect that the absence of
limits concerning this expressing power leads to a contradiction. Actually, the fact that prevents
us from continuing our procedure can, from the opposite point of view, be taken as a condition
under which this procedure can, in fact, be accomplished. Indeed, though p does not belong to
S, there might exist elements of S that can, in some way, represent it, that is, play the role of p
within S ! Of course, these elements, in some sense, should ‘express the same state of affairs’ as
p . Now, recall that p is a sentence with an indefinite subject so it cannot be true or false since
it ‘depends on x’. p becomes a single sentence only after substituting an n ∈ N for the variable
x in it. Well, those formal expressions that have the corresponding property are just the proper
formulas of S. So we are seeking a formula, say pi, ‘to the same effect’ as p , which obviously
means that pi and p have to be true and false at the same time, in other words, they have to be
true exactly for the same formulas, that is, by (11),
(12) for any n ∈ N , pi[n] ∈ T iff g−1(n)[n] 6∈ T .
Our arguments above made it clear that the existence of such a formula characterizes an abstract
formal system in a fundamental way guaranteeing that a given object (the set of expressions
whose names 19 satisfy (11) ) can be talked about within the system. Thus the expansion of this
property to any set of objects is related to the expressive power (or, as it is often called, the
strength) of a formal system.
Definition
Let S be an abstract formal system, and let T ⊆ S , X ⊆ N be arbitrary. We say that X is
T–representable (in S) if there is a ϕ ∈ F such that for every n ∈ N ,
ϕ[n] ∈ T iff n ∈ X .
The formula ϕ is said to T–represent X (in S).
Well, if pi represents the set {n ∈ N : g−1(n)[n] 6∈ T}, that is, the condition (12) holds, then we
can consider pi as a representative of p within S and can continue the process of formalization
using it as the formal version of p (recall that p is the reformulation of p in terms of S) to obtain
the formal version of f = p(‘p’). In fact, in this case, the formal object corresponding to ‘p’ is
g(pi), so the one corresponding to f is pi[g(pi)]. This is the sentence of S corresponding to the
Findlay paradox, which is, in turn, nothing else than a reformulation of the Liar. Consequently,
18A. Tarski examined first systematically the possibility of eliminating the paradox along these lines (cf. [T]).
19Let us stress again: we use the names of objects to talk about them.
we have obtained the formal version of the Liar. With the notations above,
the Formal Liar is the sentence λ = pi[g(pi)].
This is the formal sentence we sought. Like its informal counterpart, it turns out to be neither
true nor false witnessing the fact that the formula pi it is built on cannot exist. The statement
to this effect is the resolution of our paradox in a formal setting. Note that the proof is, in fact,
the formalization of the informal argument: the Formal Liar is true iff it is false.
Proposition (The Liar Theorem)
Let S be an abstract formal system and T ⊆ S. The set {n ∈ N : g−1(n)[n] 6∈ T} is not
T–representable.
Proof.
Let us suppose that, on the contrary, there is a pi ∈ F such that pi T–represents the set
{n ∈ N : g−1(n)[n] 6∈ T}, that is, pi[n] ∈ T iff g−1(n)[n] 6∈ T . Let λ = pi[g(pi)] and
n = g(pi). Then λ = pi[g(pi)] ∈ T iff pi[n] ∈ T iff g−1(n)[n] 6∈ T iff g−1(g(pi))[g(pi)] 6∈ T iff
λ = pi[g(pi)] 6∈ T , which is a contradiction.
So we have the formal version of the Liar at last. To be entirely sincere, the paradox in
this form is not too exciting since it is not easy to interpret in informal terms, or, simply, to
understand what it is all about. In order to grasp its essence, we should make it more transparent
by giving a name to the fundamental notion lying at the heart of the whole matter we examine.
c. The Generalized Liar Theorem
Before analyzing the Liar theorem in order to understand it better, however, we should make a
remark. Actually, there is an important point to stress here. When we formulated the definition
of representability, we have taken for granted that the answer to the question whether a given
statement is satisfactory, agreeable, acceptable etc. or not depends on its truth. The truth of a
statement, on the other hand, means some kind of proper correspondence or adequacy between
the state of affairs and the statement concerned. So far so good. But let us stop here for
a moment. Truth is, by no means, the only concept connecting facts to statements in some
way or other, thus it is not the only possibility to chose from for formulating the definition of
representability. Actually, there could exist and do exist other ‘measures of adequacy’ than truth
that lend themselves to formalization more or less readily. It is enough to think of the notions
of probability or confirmability (to different extents). These are, clearly, ‘weaker’ notions than
truth. In the other direction, we can find the ‘stronger’ ones the most obvious choice of which is,
of course, that of provability. To be more precise, it would be better to speak about provability in
plural since one can introduce, in a very natural way, a couple of different notions of provability
widening or narrowing the circle of stipulations as to which types of logical derivations would
be accepted as a proof. Actually, we shall briefly touch upon one of these possible modifications
of the generally accepted notion of provability below.
Anyway, it is natural to generalize our treatment to include any one of these possible ‘mea-
sures of adequacy’ and not to consider our definition above as the only possible definition of
representability, but, rather, as one of them. Accordingly, in the same way as we did in the case
of true sentences, we shall represent formally the sets of sentences satisfying different possible
adequacy conditions simply by arbitrary subsets of the set of sentences and, until further notice,
shall not associate any special meaning with them. As a reminder of this fact, we repeat our
representability definition using a letter in it without any connotation :
Definition
Let S be an abstract formal system, and let A ⊆ S, X ⊆ N be arbitrary. We say that X is
A–representable (in S) if there is a ϕ ∈ F such that for every n ∈ N ,
n ∈ X iff ϕ[n] ∈ A .
The formula ϕ is said to A–represent X (in S).
Now, we can turn back to the Liar theorem. It is, no doubt, the expression g−1(n)[n] which
prevents us from interpreting it informally in an easily comprehensible way. Everything would
seem much simpler if we were able to get rid of it. Certainly, we cannot avoid handling it in
some way or other. For recall that, by (6), (9), and (10), g−1(n)[n] is just the formal version of
the phrase ‘the new sentence obtained by applying the sentence n to itself’, that is, g−1(n)[n]
is nothing else than the formalization of self–reference and, clearly, due to its central role in
the paradox, it will appear in any formulation of the Liar blurring the resulting picture unless
we restrict ourselves to formal systems that can circumvent it. Well, in those formal systems
which can do without self–reference, it is possible to talk about everything without explicit self–
reference that can be talked about at all, that is, in our formal terms, any set of names defined
by a representable set through self-reference is representable itself.20
Definition
Let S be an abstract formal system and A ⊆ S. S is self-referential with respect to A if for any
X ⊆ N ,
{n ∈ N : g(g−1(n)[n]) ∈ X} is A–representable whenever X is A–representable.
With the notion of self–referentiality at our disposal, we get to the last step of our formal-
ization process. Recognizing that the set T plays a double role in the Liar theorem, it is very
natural to modify the wording and proof of this statement in the only obvious way to obtain a
theorem and its proof about the relation between two sets of sentences in place of a less general
proposition being about only a single one. This modification of the Liar theorem, together with
the application of self–referentiality, yields the generalized formal version of the original Liar
paradox.
Theorem (The Generalized Liar Theorem)
Let S be an abstract formal system, A ⊆ F , B ⊆ S. Let S be self–referential with respect to B
and suppose that ∼ A is B–representable. Then S ∩A 6= B .
Proof.
Since∼A is B–representable and S is self–referential with respect toB, {n ∈N : g(g−1(n)[n]) 6∈A}
is also B–representable, that is, there is a pi ∈ F such that for any n ∈ N , pi[n] ∈ B iff
g(g−1(n)[n]) 6∈ A. Let n = g(pi) and λ = pi[g(pi)]. Then, on the one hand, λ ∈ S. On the other
hand, λ = pi[g(pi)] ∈ B iff pi[n] ∈ B iff g(g−1(n)[n]) 6∈ A iff g−1(n)[n] 6∈ A iff g−1(g(pi))[g(pi)] 6∈ A
iff λ = pi[g(pi)] 6∈ A. That is, we have a λ ∈ S, such that λ ∈ B iff λ 6∈ A , which was to be
proved.
Of course, in such an abstract wording, this theorem does not seem to tell much about the
relevant formal systems of mathematics. Before applying it to the logical notions that are the
usual objects of metamathematical investigations, however, we would like to illustrate the way
it can be used by applying it to the notion of provability in less than a given number of steps
not usually examined despite its very interesting intuitive meaning.
Mimicking the informal systems of mathematics, we can define the set of provable sentences
in an abstract formal system P along the following lines. After selecting a set of sentences that
are called axioms and a set of rules for inferring an expression from a finite set of other ones, a
proof is defined as a finite sequence of expressions every element of which is an axiom or can be
inferred from the set of elements preceding the given one. A sentence is defined to be provable,
in other words to be a theorem, if it is the last element of some proof. Now, for any positive
integer n, let us define the set Pn as that of the sentences provable in less than n steps, that is,
appearing as the last element of a proof consisting of less than n expressions. Further, let P be
the set of all provable sentences of P. Clearly, Pn ⊆ P for any n. Thus if we interpret A and B
in the Generalized Liar theorem as Pn and P respectively, then we have
20 This property corresponds to the condition formulated in the fixed–point (or diagonal ) lemma of mathematical
logic. The most obvious examples of formal systems with this property are those induced by natural languages,
which are rich enough to contain the expression corresponding to the general self–reference itself (cf. (9)). What
is more important is that the same is true for the usual formal systems of arithmetic.
Proposition
Let P be self–referential with respect to P . For any positive integer n, if ∼ Pn is P–representable,
then P ∼ Pn 6= ∅.
The proof of the fact that in the most important cases of the systems of formalized arithmetic
the conditions of the proposition actually hold for any positive integer is essentially simple.
Yet, being a bit too technical, it does not fit into our non–technical exposition. Nevertheless,
the conclusion of the proposition is worth spelling out in a little more detail since its informal
interpretation reveals an interesting feature of the system considered. Actually, it means that
for any positive integer n, however large it is, there are theorems of the system that can only be
proved in more than n steps, that is, there are arbitrary long proofs establishing new theorems.
This, on the one hand, means some kind of practical incompleteness since there are theorems of
the system whose demonstration needs an astronomical period of time, consequently, although
they are theoretically provable, will never be proved for banal practical reasons: mankind simply
has not and will never have enough time to prove them. From another point of view, this very
property corresponds formally to the ‘unboundedness’ of the formal system considered, that is,
to the fact that there are new theorems being arbitrarily ‘far’ 21 from the axioms thus asserts
formally its inexhaustibility, complexity, or richness.
Now, let us turn to those special abstract formal systems, that constitute the conceptual
framework for investigating the theoretical aspects of mathematical activity.
3. Limitations of logical systems
In order to apply the Generalized Liar theorem to the real systems of mathematics, we should
formulate the minimum requirements any ordinary logic has to comply with. Obviously, such
a system ought to have two distinguished subsets of sentences that can be interpreted as those
of provable and true sentences respectively and the system has to be able to express the basic
logical operation of negation. We shall explain informally the basic properties characterizing the
different logical systems after defining them formally.
Definition
(i) We say that an abstract formal system S is a logical system (with respect to P and T ) if
P, T ⊆ S and, for any ϕ ∈ F , there is a ϕ′ ∈ F , called the negation of ϕ (or not ϕ) such
that, for any n ∈ N ,
(a) ϕ[n] ∈ T iff ϕ′[n] 6∈ T (b) ϕ[n] ∈ P iff ϕ′′[n] ∈ P
(In particular, for any σ ∈ S, σ ∈ T iff σ′ 6∈ T , σ ∈ P iff σ′′ ∈ P .) P and T are called the
sets of provable and true sentences of S respectively. We shall use the following notation
for any set H ⊆ F : H ′ = {ϕ : ϕ′ ∈ H} .
(ii) A logical system is consistent if P ∩ P ′ = ∅ , otherwise it is inconsistent.
(iii) A logical system is complete if P ∪ P ′ = S, otherwise it is incomplete.
(iv) A logical system is sound if P ⊆ T .
Obviously, consistency is one of those conditions that any meaningful logical system should
satisfy since this means that it is free of contradiction: for any sentence and its negation,
at most one of them belongs to the set of provable sentences. Moreover, clearly, the set of
provable sentences has to be chosen in such a way that the system remain sound; only the true
sentences are permitted to be provable. On the other hand, our main concern is to examine the
completeness of formal systems, the property which is, in some sense, a maximal requirement,
21As a matter of fact, it is a little more than a suggestive metaphor to say that two sentences are far from
each other since the function assigning to any two sentences the length of the proof deriving the second sentence
from the first one is a possible generalization of the notion of distance. In fact, it essentially coincides with a
notion of functional analysis, namely that of the quasi–pseudometric, which is a metric without the requirement
of symmetry satisfying, among others, the triangle inequality.
a dual of the consistency. In complete systems, for an arbitrary sentence and its negation, at
least one of them does belong to the set of provable sentences. The importance of this notion
stems from the fact that, since all the interesting formal systems are sound, any one of them is
complete iff P = T , 22 that is, all true sentences are, in fact, provable.23
Well, since P ,P ′ ⊆ S , P ∪ P ′ = S iff (S ∼ P ) ∩ (S ∼ P ′) = ∅ . Thus a logical system S is
complete and consistent iff (P ∩ P ′) ∪
(
(S ∼ P ) ∩ (S ∼ P ′)
)
= ∅ iff S ∼ P = P ′. Clearly, the
relation between the last equation and the conclusion of the Generalized Liar theorem needs no
comment, they together yield an abstract version of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem to the effect
that, under suitable conditions concerning self-referentiality and representability, consistency
and completeness exclude each other. Actually, restricting ourselves to logical systems, the
Generalized Liar theorem takes a form that yields the abstract versions of three basic limitation
theorems of mathematical logic demonstrating that they are all different manifestations of the
same logical principle.24
Theorem (Abstract versions of theorems of Go¨del, Tarski, and Church)
Let S be an arbitrary logical system.
(i) (a) Let us suppose that S is self-referential with respect to P and P is P–representable.
If S is consistent, then S is incomplete.
(b) Let us suppose that S is self-referential with respect to T and P is T–representable.
If S is sound, then S is incomplete.
(ii) Let us suppose that S is self-referential with respect to T. Then
T is not T–representable.
(iii) Let us suppose that S is self-referential with respect to P . Then
∼ P is not P–representable.
Proof.
We list the substitutions needed to obtain the different items from the Generalized Liar theorem:
(i)(a): A =∼ P , B = P ′ (i)(b): A = P , B = T (ii): A = T , B = T (iii): A = P , B = P .
Going into a little more detail, it directly follows from the definitions that, generally, for any
set C ⊆ S, if C is T–represented by ϕ ∈ F , then ∼ C is T–represented by ϕ′ ∈ F and if C is
P–represented by ϕ ∈ F , then C is P ′–represented by ϕ′ ∈ F . Further, self–referentiality of
S with respect to P implies its self–referentiality with respect to P ′. Using these facts where
needed, we have:
(i)(a) ∼∼ P = P , so, by the Generalized Liar, S ∼ P 6= P ′ , which in turn, by our remarks
preceding the theorem, means that consistency implies incompleteness.
(i)(b) By the Generalized Liar, P 6= T . S is sound, thus S is incomplete (cf. footnote 22).
(ii) By the Generalized Liar, T–representability of ∼T implies T 6= T .
(iii) By the Generalized Liar, P–representability of ∼P implies P 6= P .
Let us underline that, the theorem above is, in a sense, exhaustive, it contains the generaliza-
tions of all the known main limitation theorems on truth and provability that can be formulated
22Indeed, supposing the soundness, P 6= T implies that there is a σ 6∈ P such that σ ∈ T (iff σ′ 6∈ T ), that is,
σ′ 6∈ P . On the other hand, by T ∪ T ′ = S , σ 6∈ P and σ′ 6∈ P implies that σ ∈ T ∼ P or σ′ ∈ T ∼ P i.e. P 6= T .
23 Moreover the notion of completeness is important from a ‘practical’ point of view as well. Indeed, in the
case of the formal systems describing mathematical structures, the complete systems are decidable in the sense
that there is an entirely mechanical rule to answer the question whether a sentence is a theorem or not. Actually,
in these systems, the set of the finite sequences of expressions (which themselves are finite sequences of symbols
chosen from a finite vocabulary) can be enumerated, and, as they mirror the world of informal mathematics, the
notion of the proof in these systems is defined in such a way that the fact whether a given sequence of expressions
is a proof or not can be decided in a finite number of steps. So we simply enumerate all the proofs until our
sentence or its negation appears as a last element of some proof since we know that one of them, being provable,
must emerge sooner or later.
24Smullyan investigated a wide variety of abstract limitation theorems in [S2]. It is interesting, however, that he
has apparently not recognized their common logical structure or, at least, has not found it to be worth examining.
on the level of abstraction implicitly defined by the formalization of the ordinary–language
Liar.25 Actually, in addition to its first main item consisting of two abstract versions of Go¨del’s
incompleteness theorem describing the relation between provability and refutability 26 and that
between provability and truth , respectively, it contains, as its second and third main items, a
generalization of the Tarski theorem on the undefinability of truth ,27 and an abstract variant
of the theorem of Church on the undecidability of provability 28.29 Moreover, covering every
sensible cast of roles for the Generalized Liar theorem, its proof indicates that the theorems of
Go¨del, Tarski, and Church are just the only possible relevant limitation results given in terms
of truth and provability alone that can be considered as some direct reformulations of the Liar
paradox within the conceptual framework of modern mathematical logic.
As a matter of fact, on the other hand, this theorem constitutes the final point where we
can get to solely on the basis of the Liar paradox without entering into the detailed analysis of
individual formal systems. The theorem above describes the general conceptual structure of the
limitation theorems concerning the formal systems of mathematics, making explicit the different
roles played, so to speak, by some general laws of logic (represented by the Liar) on the one
hand, and, on the other, by the special features of the particular system concerned. Actually,
the theorem shows that, in the case of any given system, its limitations depend on its expressive
power regarding self-referentiality and representability. In other words, examining completeness,
decidability, or the capability to express the notion of truth in the case of any segment of real
mathematical activity (as e.g. the arithmetic of natural numbers), where the expressions defined
by the structure under investigation are given, the main question reduces to the more or less
technical one as to whether we can find a naming function such that the resulting logical system
satisfies the conditions of the theorem concerning self-referentiality and representability. From
this general point of view, the essence of Go¨del’s original result on the incompleteness of formal
arithmetic consists in demonstrating that such a naming function, in fact, exists in this special
case, so that the theorem can indeed be applied to the logical systems of arithmetic.30
Finally, let us apply our theorem in a nonstandard way in the opposite direction. Presburger
25Indeed, the only missing important limitation theorem, perhaps the most important one, Go¨del’s theorem on
the unprovability of consistency (to the effect that ‘arithmetic cannot prove its own consistency’) cannot be taken
as a different limitation theorem on the level of our formalization since it is, essentially, the formal version of the
incompleteness theorem itself given on a still deeper level, within formal arithmetic.
26A sentence is refutable if its negation is provable. Note that this statement is a purely syntactical one having
essentially nothing to do with the notion of truth.
27Informally this result can be interpreted as stating that the notion of being true in S cannot be defined within S.
28In the case of the usual formal systems describing the arithmetic of natural numbers, the informal content
of this theorem is that there is no mechanical way to decide whether a given sentence is a theorem or not. In
fact, in the case of these systems (in which N is a subset of natural numbers), there are several equivalent formal
notions devised to formalize the informal notion of decidability of the question whether a given natural number
belongs to a given set of natural numbers. One of them is the property that both the set under consideration and
its complement are P–representable. An argument completely analogous to that given in footnote 23 may shed
some light on this connection between decidability and provability, at least in one direction.
29The original theorems can be found in every textbook on mathematical logic, see e.g. [E] or [M].
30Go¨del discovered the ingenious method of associating numbers with expressions in such a way that the
resulting naming function has the most important property of the quotation as the naming of ordinary languages,
viz. that the name of an expression contains every important information of the named object (clearly, the
quoted version of a common language expression is ideal in this respect) thus the logical system endowed with
such a naming function inherits the expressive power of natural languages, among others, their self–referentiality
and the fact that P is representable. Loosely speaking, the expressive power of arithmetic can be compared to
that of the natural languages since it can also be forced to talk about itself. The discovery of this revolutionary
technique is often likened to the invention of Cartesian coordinate geometry, that is, ‘Go¨del invented what might be
called co-ordinate metamathematics’ (R.B. Braithwaite). This method of so–called Go¨del numbering can easily be
modified to provide similar results in the case of important mathematical theories other than arithmetic. Detailed
description of Go¨del numbering and the proof of the representability of P in the usual systems of arithmetic can
be found in every treatise on mathematic logic, among others e.g. in [E] and [M]. On the other hand, although
the notion of self–referentiality is not usually treated in the textbooks explicitly, to check that it holds for the
systems considered is only a matter of a simple and straightforward calculation.
has shown that the additive number theory (the weakened version of the standard Peano arith-
metic obtained by the omission of multiplication) is complete (cf. [C] p. 43.) In this system
the set of all expressions can be enumerated, and the question whether a given element of the
resulting sequence is a provable sentence or not can be decided (cf. footnote 23). So the naming
function g can be defined by recursion in the following way. For any expression e, we set g(e),
according to whether it is a provable sentence or not, to be the smallest even or odd natural
number, respectively, that has not already been chosen. Now, P = T , since the system consid-
ered is complete. On the other hand, both the set of all even natural numbers and that of all
odd ones are representable 31. Consequently, in this system T, P, and ∼ P are both P– and
T–representable (so, among others, the truth is definable 32) and, therefore, by the theorem, this
system is self–referential with respect to neither T nor P .
In the light of this example and the fact that Go¨del’s incompleteness result provides examples
of self-referential logical systems in which P is representable (thus the system is incomplete), it
would be interesting to find self-referential complete logical systems (if they exist at all), which
will yield a complete description of the mutual correspondence between the general properties
of self-referentiality, representability and completeness.
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